The AIL Framework crawler task creation API (api_add_crawler_task) contained an insufficient authorization check when a user supplied a cookiejar UUID to attach to a one-shot or scheduled crawler task. The original code only verified that the cookiejar existed and, if its access level was 0, compared the cookiejar's owning user ID to the requesting user ID. It did not validate organizational boundaries, did not account for the requesting user's role. When the cookiejar level was not 0, no access check was performed at all. An authenticated user could therefore reference another organization's cookiejar by UUID and have the crawler use that organization's stored cookies (session tokens, authentication credentials) when performing web crawls, effectively leaking or exfiltrating the victim organization's session data.
The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with the ability to create crawler tasks. The attacker must know or guess a valid cookiejar UUID belonging to another organization. The impact is unauthorized access to another organization's stored cookies and session data through the crawler infrastructure.
The cookiejar attachment path in api_add_crawler_task is now validated through the existing api_check_cookiejar_access_acl() function, which enforces organization, user, and role-based access control for the 'view' action on the referenced cookiejar. The user_role parameter is propagated from the API and UI entry points (api_rest.py, crawler_splash.py) into the ACL check. Separately, URL scheme validation is enforced unconditionally: only http and https schemes are accepted, and non-conforming URLs are rejected with a 400 error before any further processing.