CVE-2026-101340 PUBLISHED

Query ID predictable from a short sequence of observations

Assigner: NLnet Labs
Reserved: 28.09.2026 Published: 20.11.2026 Updated: 20.11.2026

Net::DNS uses a 16-bit query ID to match responses to the corresponding requests. In versions up to and including 1.57, the ID is obtained from Perl's built-in rand() function. An attacker that can observe the sequence of query IDs is able to expose the internal state of the PNRG and hence predict query IDs before they are transmitted. The victim Net::DNS instance is then exposed to forged responses injected by the attacker. Note that the deduplication cache in 1.57 has no impact on the feasibility of this attack.

Metrics

CVSS Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CVSS Score: 9.1

Product Status

Vendor NLnet Labs
Product Net::DNS
Versions Default: unaffected
  • affected from 0.02 to 0.* (excl.)
  • affected from 1.00 to 1.58 (excl.)

Solutions

This issue is fixed in 1.58 and all later versions.

Credits

  • Xiang Li, Aichun Huang, Zheli Liu (AOSP Lab @Nankai University) finder

References

Problem Types

  • CWE-338 Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) CWE