CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function in the ait.core.server telemetry and command broker (ait-server) in NASA-AMMOS AIT-Core through 3.1.1 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker with network access to the ZeroMQ message bus to inject spacecraft command data, exfiltrate command and telemetry traffic, inject forged telemetry, or disrupt the command and telemetry bus. The ait-server ZeroMQ broker binds its XSUB and XPUB sockets to all network interfaces by default without authentication or transport security. An attacker able to reach TCP port 5559 can publish messages onto internal topics, including the commands command topic. With the shipped default configuration, command messages are forwarded through command_stream and emitted on the command-uplink UDP path. An attacker able to reach TCP port 5560 can subscribe to command and telemetry traffic on the ground bus. AIT-Core 3.1.2 changes the default ZeroMQ bind addresses to loopback.
The vulnerability is exploitable when ait-server is running and an attacker can reach the ZeroMQ XSUB or XPUB interfaces on TCP ports 5559 or 5560. The shipped default configuration binds these interfaces to all network interfaces.
Upgrade to AIT-Core 3.1.2 or later. Version 3.1.2 changes the default ZeroMQ XSUB and XPUB bind addresses to loopback. Deployments that require the ZeroMQ message bus to operate across multiple hosts should protect the bus using authenticated and encrypted transport such as ZeroMQ CURVE or an equivalent mutually authenticated TLS-protected network layer.