VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) on-prem has a security issue where this issue may allow a remote attacker to access privileged internal functionality and impact the VCO host. Successful exploitation may compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the orchestrator and data managed by the orchestrator.
On an affected system, any authenticated user can gain operator privileges and masquerade as a local "superuser operator" user. This includes access to functionality that is intended for internal use only and which is not intended to be remotely accessible.
Hosted, including Dedicated, versions of VCO were impacted and have already been patched.
VCO is exposed by default. A successful attack requires network access to the VCO web interface and a valid authenticated session on the VCO portal. The minimum user role required is Enterprise Read Only, the lowest built-in tenant role. There is no configuration that can prevent the exposure.
Until the fixed software is deployed, operators should apply defense-in-depth controls appropriate for their environment:
- Restrict access to the VCO web interface to trusted administrative networks.
- Monitor the VCO for accesses from known malicious source IPs.
- Monitor for unexpected outbound network activity from the VCO host.
- Consider blocking outbound ports not needed for normal activities.
- Monitor for backdoor daemons and webshells.
- Review recent administrator activity for unexpected changes.
The recommended resolution is to upgrade to a fixed VCO release at your earliest convenience.
These vulnerabilities have been fixed in the following releases:
- VCO 5.2.3.18 and later in the 5.2 train
- VCO 6.1.3.10 and later in the 6.1 train
- VCO 6.4.2.12 and later in the 6.4 train