CVE-2026-125275 PUBLISHED

A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever

Assigner: EEF
Reserved: 11.11.2026 Published: 17.11.2026 Updated: 17.11.2026

Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.

The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.

This issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.

Metrics

CVSS Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CVSS Score: 8.2

Product Status

Vendor nerves-hub
Product nerves_hub_web
Versions Default: unaffected
  • affected from 1.0.0 to 2.5.4 (excl.)
Vendor nerves-hub
Product nerves_hub_web
Versions Default: unaffected
  • affected from 1.0.0 to 2.5.4 (excl.)
Vendor nerves-hub
Product nerves_hub_web
Versions Default: unaffected
  • affected from a49fb8875f3aab40062881028ef4e406d985aaa9 to 064e78cc189dd9b87748746f44179632a52ddf58 (excl.)

Affected Configurations

The certificate chain must end at a root in the device endpoint's trust store. With DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE unset, which is the default from 2.0.0, the trust store holds the public roots from CAStore. With DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE set to a bundle that holds a root which signs device certificates, any certificate from that root whose CA is not registered is sufficient, including the certificate of a deleted device.

The retry in Erlang/OTP ssl was confirmed on Erlang/OTP 28.3, 29.0 and 29.1. Earlier releases were not checked.

Workarounds

Set DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose. A certificate from an unregistered CA is then refused once and the handshake ends. Devices whose certificate or CA is registered in NervesHub continue to connect.

Restarting a node ends the handshakes that are already stuck on it.

Credits

  • deasthamgp finder
  • deasthamgp reporter
  • Josh Kalderimis remediation developer
  • Jonatan Männchen / EEF coordinator

References

Problem Types

  • CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition CWE

Impacts

  • An unauthenticated client can leave a handshake process on a device node running and querying the database after it disconnects. Each further connection adds another such process, and they stop only when the node restarts. Devices and users of the instance lose service while the nodes and the database are saturated.