A link-following flaw was found in the authorized_key module of the ansible.posix collection, residual to the fix for CVE-2026-11837. That fix guards only the final path component (os.chown with follow_symlinks=False and O_NOFOLLOW in _safe_open_write()). When an unprivileged local user replaces their ~/.ssh directory with a symlink to a directory they do not own, and an operator subsequently runs the authorized_key task as root (a common provisioning pattern), the module resolves its path operations through the symlink: atomic_move() writes the temporary file in the symlink target and renames it to <target>/authorized_keys, creating or overwriting a file in the attacker-chosen directory, and os.chmod(sshdir, 0o700) follows the symlink and changes the target directory's permissions. The written file is chowned to the unprivileged user, so this is not a privilege escalation, but it allows an attacker to create or overwrite files (for example in /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/, which APT reads regardless of file ownership) to cause integrity and availability impacts.
Do not run ansible.posix.authorized_key as root against home or .ssh directories that unprivileged users can modify. Verify that target directories are not attacker-controllable symlinks before running the task.