A flaw was found in the AWX GitHub webhook integration. When processing GitHub pull_request webhooks, the controller stores the pull_request.statuses_url value from the webhook payload without validating that it points to a trusted GitHub API endpoint. If a job template is configured with a GitHub Personal Access Token as its webhook credential, the controller later POSTs that token to the stored callback URL when posting job status updates. An attacker who can submit a correctly signed forged webhook using the job template's webhook_key can redirect the callback to an attacker-controlled URL and exfiltrate the configured GitHub PAT.
The following practices may reduce exposure to this flaw until a fix is available:
1. Restrict network access to controller webhook endpoints so only trusted GitHub egress IPs or an approved reverse proxy can reach them.
2. Protect job template webhook keys as secrets; restrict Job Template admin access; rotate webhook keys if compromise is suspected.
3. If commit status callback to GitHub is not required, configure GitHub webhooks without a webhook_credential on the job template (this disables PAT transmission on job completion).
4. Monitor controller logs and outbound connections for unexpected callback destinations following webhook-triggered jobs.