Flowintel disabled TLS certificate verification for all MISP API connections and used unverified SSL contexts for IMAP and SMTP STARTTLS mail connections. This allowed an on-path (man-in-the-middle) attacker positioned between Flowintel and its MISP or mail servers to impersonate the remote server and intercept sensitive data.
Affected connections include:
- All MISP HTTPS API calls (event retrieval, attribute search, event creation, connectivity checks, and API validation)
- SMTP STARTTLS connections used for sending email notifications
- IMAP TLS connections used for fetching mail archives and testing connectivity
An attacker who can observe or intercept network traffic between Flowintel and the MISP or mail server could:
- Capture MISP API keys and mail credentials (SMTP/IMAP passwords)
- Read all threat intelligence data exchanged (events, attributes, objects, reports)
- Inject or modify threat intelligence data returned to Flowintel
The vulnerability required no authentication on the part of the attacker and no user interaction; it was exploitable by any party with a network position between Flowintel and its configured MISP or mail endpoints.
Affected versions: Flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
The fix introduces a shared TLS utility module that enforces certificate and hostname verification by default for all MISP and mail connections. MISP clients now receive a proper SSL verification context instead of ssl=False, and IMAP/SMTP connections use a verified ssl.SSLContext. Operators may configure a private CA bundle path or explicitly disable verification (which fails closed on malformed input). The previous urllib3 warning suppression is removed, and upgrade documentation warns that previously accepted self-signed or mismatched certificates will now cause connection failures.