On a Kong Mesh global control plane, resources received over the zone-to-global KDS sync are attributed using the in-band, sender-controlled ControlPlane.Identifier rather than the authenticated zone identity derived from the connection. Authenticated zones can have the global control plane store and re-distribute those resources as belonging to another zone.
The result is a cross-zone isolation bypass: the holder of a single enrolled zone's credential can inject, attribute, and overwrite resources in another zone's namespace mesh-wide.
The root cause lives in Kuma's open-source KDS sync code, which Kong Mesh's control plane is built on.
You are affected only if you run a multi-zone deployment of Kong Mesh. If a threat actor controls, or holds a valid zone token for, at least one enrolled zone they can leverage the issue.
You are not affected if you run a single-zone deployment.
Restrict which zones may enroll and protect zone tokens. No configuration flag disables the in-band attribution, so upgrading is the only fix.
Upgrade to Kong Mesh 2.7.29, 2.9.19, 2.11.18, 2.12.14, 2.13.10 or 2.14.2, whichever matches your release line. In patched versions the global KDS ingest path attributes synced resources by the authenticated connection identity instead of the in-band field.