A bug in the Airlock Gateway (8.5.2 and earlier, and 8.6.0) allows attacker-controlled HTML in a backend response to exploit the Smart Form Protection feature, possibly leading to a Denial of Service (DoS) or Remote Code Execution (RCE) attack against the Airlock Gateway. The issue has been fixed in Airlock Gateway version 8.5.3 and 8.6.1.
For an attack to be executable, the Airlock Gateway needs to have 'Smart Form Protection' (or the corresponding expert settings) enabled on a mapping whose backend returns a response containing certain multi-byte HTML character references. The buffer overflow then happens during the parsing of that HTML response. Such a response can come either from a malicious or compromised backend, or from an otherwise trusted backend that returns attacker-supplied HTML, e.g. an application that stores and serves plain user-provided HTML files.
Successfully exploiting the vulnerability can enable an attacker to perform a DoS attack or, in the worst case, an RCE attack against the Airlock Gateway in front of the affected backend. Compromising the functionality of the Airlock Gateway could in this way also affect the availability and protection of other well-intentioned backends deployed behind the same Gateway.
For an attack to be executable, the Airlock Gateway needs to have 'Smart Form Protection' (or the corresponding expert settings) enabled on a mapping whose backend returns a response containing certain multi-byte HTML character references. This could be a malicious or compromised backend behind the affected mapping, or an application that serves user-uploaded HTML.
This 'Smart Form Protection' feature is not active in a default mapping configuration and must be explicitly enabled by an administrator.
A trusted backend that does not serve attacker-controlled HTML is extremely unlikely to trigger the bug accidentally.