In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()
ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each
response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields
from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int
arithmetic. Three cases can overflow:
KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST:
msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz;
KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST:
msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) +
resp->payload_sz;
KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT:
msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) +
resp->ngroups * sizeof(gid_t);
resp->payload_sz is __u32 and resp->ngroups is __s32. Each addition
can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes
signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX
before the multiply. A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to
equal entry->msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and
downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp->payload_sz,
kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext->ngroups) then trust the
unverified length.
Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST
paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional
payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte
chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is
unworkable on the response side. For LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT, reject
resp->ngroups outside the signed [0, NGROUPS_MAX] range up front and
report the error from ipc_validate_msg() so it fires at the IPC
boundary; with that bound the subsequent multiplication and addition
stay well below UINT_MAX. The now-redundant ngroups check and
pr_err in ksmbd_alloc_user() are removed.
This is the response-side analogue of aab98e2dbd64 ("ksmbd: fix
integer overflows on 32 bit systems"), which hardened the request
side.