CVE-2026-47174 PUBLISHED

Duck Site: Untrusted pull request code can trigger privileged production deployment

Assigner: GitHub_M
Reserved: 18.05.2026 Published: 11.06.2026 Updated: 11.06.2026

In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.

Metrics

CVSS Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
CVSS Score: 9.5

Product Status

Vendor duck-organization
Product duck-site
Versions
  • Version < 1.0.1 is affected

References

Problem Types

  • CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere CWE