In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: validate CP_GFX_SHADOW chunk size in CS pass1
Add a minimum-length check for the AMDGPU_CHUNK_ID_CP_GFX_SHADOW chunk in
amdgpu_cs_pass1(), matching the gate already present for the IB, FENCE and
BO_HANDLES chunk types.
The CP_GFX_SHADOW case previously shared a bare break with the dependency
and syncobj chunk types, which do not dereference a fixed-size struct. When
userspace submits this chunk with length_dw == 0, vmemdup_array_user() is
called with size 0 and returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the IS_ERR()
check. amdgpu_cs_p2_shadow() then dereferences chunk->kdata as a struct
drm_amdgpu_cs_chunk_cp_gfx_shadow (reading shadow->flags), faulting on the
ZERO_SIZE_PTR and causing a NULL-pointer dereference.
This is reachable by an unprivileged process in the render group. Reject
undersized chunks with -EINVAL during pass1 so the bad submission is
rejected before pass2 ever dereferences the data.
(cherry picked from commit 7f61b2eef7415eccdb40850aca0de94211948657)