In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: call _ntfs_bad_inode() when failing to rename
It is safe to call _ntfs_bad_inode on live inodes since:
commit 519b078998ce ("fs/ntfs3: Exclude call make_bad_inode for live nodes.")
The WARN_ON was added when it wasn't safe by:
commit d99208b91933 ("fs/ntfs3: cancle set bad inode after removing name fails")
Replace the WARN_ON with a call to _ntfs_bad_inode() to prevent further
operations on the inconsistent inode.
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS Score: 9.8
AV:N - ntfs3 registers export_operations and rename on an NFS- or SMB-exported NTFS volume reaches ni_rename() through nfsd/ksmbd vfs_rename without any local syscall; hybrid NAS and Windows/Linux file-server deployments are a reasonable high-impact reach path for this VFS rename flaw.
AC:L - An attacker controls the on-disk NTFS layout and rename arguments so ni_add_name succeeds and both ni_remove_name steps fail deterministically; syzkaller reproduces this with a crafted loop image and no races or victim-specific timing outside attacker influence.
PR:N - Exploitation needs only permission to rename on an exported NTFS share (including guest/anonymous NFS or SMB write access) or to supply removable media later mounted by the host; no init-namespace root, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, or other elevated host credentials are required.
UI:N - Once an administrator has mounted and exported the NTFS volume (or automounted dual-boot/shared storage), the attacker triggers the flawed rename directly; no further victim clicks, file opens, or cooperative actions are needed beyond that standing configuration.
S:U - Impact is kernel heap/metadata corruption and denial of service within the same kernel security authority; this is standard local or network filesystem exploitation, not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or cross-scope sandbox breakout.
C:H - Leaving the inode operable after a failed rename rollback preserves inconsistent MFT/directory index state; subsequent lookups and index walks parse attacker-influenced corrupt metadata, matching ntfs3 guidance to score metadata corruption that can yield kernel memory disclosure as High.
I:H - Without ni_bad set, further writes, unlinks, and renames continue against mismatched $FILE_NAME and $I30 state, propagating attacker-steerable directory/MFT corruption and heap metadata damage that can be leveraged for arbitrary kernel writes or control-flow hijack.
A:H - The vulnerable path emits WARN_ON in ni_rename (kernel panic on panic_on_warn) and syzbot also hit a kernel paging fault in folio_wait_bit_common after follow-on operations on the inconsistent inode; any kernel oops, hang, or panic from continued use scores Availability High.
| Attack Vector |
Network |
Scope |
Unchanged |
| Attack Complexity |
Low |
Confidentiality Impact |
High |
| Privileges Required |
None |
Integrity Impact |
High |
| User Interaction |
None |
Availability Impact |
High |
AV:N - ntfs3 registers export_operations and rename on an NFS- or SMB-exported NTFS volume reaches ni_rename() through nfsd/ksmbd vfs_rename without any local syscall; hybrid NAS and Windows/Linux file-server deployments are a reasonable high-impact reach path for this VFS rename flaw.
AC:L - An attacker controls the on-disk NTFS layout and rename arguments so ni_add_name succeeds and both ni_remove_name steps fail deterministically; syzkaller reproduces this with a crafted loop image and no races or victim-specific timing outside attacker influence.
PR:N - Exploitation needs only permission to rename on an exported NTFS share (including guest/anonymous NFS or SMB write access) or to supply removable media later mounted by the host; no init-namespace root, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, or other elevated host credentials are required.
UI:N - Once an administrator has mounted and exported the NTFS volume (or automounted dual-boot/shared storage), the attacker triggers the flawed rename directly; no further victim clicks, file opens, or cooperative actions are needed beyond that standing configuration.
S:U - Impact is kernel heap/metadata corruption and denial of service within the same kernel security authority; this is standard local or network filesystem exploitation, not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or cross-scope sandbox breakout.
C:H - Leaving the inode operable after a failed rename rollback preserves inconsistent MFT/directory index state; subsequent lookups and index walks parse attacker-influenced corrupt metadata, matching ntfs3 guidance to score metadata corruption that can yield kernel memory disclosure as High.
I:H - Without ni_bad set, further writes, unlinks, and renames continue against mismatched $FILE_NAME and $I30 state, propagating attacker-steerable directory/MFT corruption and heap metadata damage that can be leveraged for arbitrary kernel writes or control-flow hijack.
A:H - The vulnerable path emits WARN_ON in ni_rename (kernel panic on panic_on_warn) and syzbot also hit a kernel paging fault in folio_wait_bit_common after follow-on operations on the inconsistent inode; any kernel oops, hang, or panic from continued use scores Availability High.
CVSS 3.1