In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix race between update_event_fields and, event_define_fields
The following sequence may leads race between event_define_fields()
and update_event_fields():
CPU0 (loads module A) CPU1 (loads module B)
=============================== ===============================
load_module(A) load_module(B)
notifier_call_chain notifier_call_chain
trace_module_notify trace_module_notify
mutex_lock(&event_mutex) trace_event_update_all()
trace_module_add_events(A) down_write(&trace_event_sem)
__register_event(call_A)
__add_event_to_tracers(call_A)
event_define_fields(call_A)
for each f: list_for_each_entry(field,
list_add(&f->link, &class->fields, link)
&class->fields) field = class->fields->next;
Where access to the class->fields is not protected by the event_mutex in
trace_event_update_all().
This produces the following panic:
Unable to handle kernel access ... at virtual address 0000000000000018
pc : update_event_fields+0xf8/0x368
Call trace:
update_event_fields+0xf8/0x368
trace_event_update_all+0x7c/0x2b4
trace_module_notify+0x4c/0x1dc
notifier_call_chain+0x84/0x168
blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x64/0xd4
load_module+0x10c8/0x123c
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0x230/0x31c
Fix by taking event_mutex in trace_event_update_all() before
trace_event_sem.