CVE-2026-80347 PUBLISHED

mcp-fetch through 1.6.3 Server-Side Request Forgery via Unstripped IPv6 Literal Brackets

Assigner: VulnCheck
Reserved: 26.08.2026 Published: 26.08.2026 Updated: 26.08.2026

mcp-fetch checks a fetch target against its SSRF guard without removing the brackets that surround an IPv6 literal. isSafeUrl reads the hostname from the parsed URL, which for a literal such as http://[::1]/ yields the bracketed string, and then tests it with net.isIP. That call returns zero for a bracketed value, so the branch holding the private-address checks is skipped entirely. The guard falls back to resolving the hostname, the bracketed string is not a resolvable name, no addresses are returned, and the target is reported safe. The HTTP client then strips the brackets and connects. Because the address may be given in IPv4-mapped form, the same path reaches any IPv4 target the loopback and private checks were meant to exclude, including link-local metadata endpoints. isPrivateIPv6 also has no case for the ::ffff: prefix, so the mapped form would still pass even if the brackets were removed. The fetch target is supplied as a tool argument, so an attacker who can influence what the model requests can read internal responses back into the model context.

Metrics

CVSS Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CVSS Score: 8.7

Product Status

Vendor kazuph
Product mcp-fetch
Versions Default: unaffected
  • affected from 0 to 1.6.3 (incl.)

Credits

  • George Chen finder

References

Problem Types

  • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) CWE