CVE-2026-84897 PUBLISHED

wolfSSH server accepts server-to-client DH group exchange messages from an unauthenticated client, causing pre-authentication primality-test CPU exhaustion and key exchange role confusion

Assigner: wolfSSL
Reserved: 02.09.2026 Published: 07.10.2026 Updated: 07.10.2026

src/internal.c in wolfSSL wolfSSH through 1.5.0 admits the server-to-client Diffie-Hellman group exchange messages SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP (31) and SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY (33) when a server receives them from an unauthenticated client. IsMessageAllowedServer() applies no direction check to the key exchange message range: when the peer is keying and no particular message is expected, which is the state a server is in for the whole window after it processes the client's KEXINIT because nothing sets handshake->expectMsgId there, the function falls out of its expectation branch without a verdict and reaches a numeric bound that admits every message id from 30 through 34. A client that negotiates diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 and then sends message 31 makes the server run the client-side handler DoKexDhGexGroup(), which validates the attacker-supplied group with two 8-round Miller-Rabin primality tests, one on p and one on (p-1)/2, on a value of up to 8192 bits. The handler then returns success: the server stores the attacker's prime and generator, generates a Diffie-Hellman key pair in the attacker's group, and sends the client-role message SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT (32) back to the attacker. Published RFC 3526 safe primes are the worst-case input and cost the attacker nothing to obtain. The primality validation was added in 1.5.0; versions from 1.2.0 through 1.4.22 admit the same message and enter the same client-role path without the primality cost. Message 33 is admitted as well, but on a server it is rejected before any cryptography because no public key check callback is registered, so it carries no comparable cost. Builds that define WOLFSSH_NO_DH_GEX_SHA256, which is implied by WOLFSSH_NO_DH or NO_SHA256, are unaffected.

Metrics

CVSS Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/AU:Y
CVSS Score: 6.9

Product Status

Vendor wolfSSL Inc.
Product wolfSSH
Versions Default: unaffected
  • affected from 1.2.0 to 1.5.0 (incl.)

Workarounds

Build wolfSSH with WOLFSSH_NO_DH_GEX_SHA256 defined so that diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 is neither offered nor accepted, which removes the message 31 dispatch path entirely. Where group exchange must stay available, lowering WOLFSSH_DEFAULT_GEXDH_MAX reduces the size of the value a peer can submit for primality testing and so the cost of a single packet, but it does not stop a server from accepting the message.

Credits

  • Abdullah Al Ishtiaq, Kai Tu, Matthew Carter, Xiaotian Zhou, Ananna Rahman, Yilu Dong, Tianwei Yu, Ali Ranjbar, Syed Rafiul Hussain finder

References

Problem Types

  • CWE-372 Incomplete Internal State Distinction CWE
  • CWE-405 Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification) CWE
  • CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption CWE

Impacts

  • Pre-authentication CPU exhaustion with a high work-per-byte ratio, plus key exchange role confusion. One unauthenticated packet of roughly 1 KB costs a wolfSSH server about 0.48 seconds of single-core CPU when it carries the 4096-bit RFC 3526 safe prime, and about 5.8 seconds when it carries the 8192-bit one, measured on a 64-bit desktop core; a single-threaded or embedded server is unavailable for that whole interval, and the cost repeats on every connection. The server then stores the attacker-chosen group, generates a Diffie-Hellman key pair in it, and sends the client-role message SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT back to the attacker, so the key exchange continues in the wrong role until it fails. Reaching the 8192-bit case requires a wolfSSL math configuration that can represent an 8192-bit integer; a default build tops out near 4096 bits and caps the burn at roughly half a second.
  • CAPEC-227 Sustained Client Engagement