In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix UAF in async copy cancel and shutdown
An async copy could be freed or used after free while a teardown caller
(OFFLOAD_CANCEL, nfsd4_shutdown_copy, nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb) raced the
copy kthread:
-
find_async_copy() bumped copy->refcount but left the copy on
clp->async_copies, so the reaper's cleanup_async_copy() could run
release_copy_files() concurrently with a cancel/shutdown caller. Both
put and NULL nf_src/nf_dst without a common lock, double-putting the
nfsd_file and freeing it early.
-
nfsd4_do_async_copy() set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED before its final uses
of the copy (nfsd_update_cmtime_attr() on copy->nf_dst,
nfsd4_send_cb_offload()). nfsd4_stop_copy() treats a set STOPPED bit
as "kthread done, skip kthread_stop()", so a teardown caller ran
release_copy_files() -- which puts and NULLs nf_dst -- while the
kthread still dereferenced it (NULL/UAF).
-
copy->copy_task was never pinned. The one-shot kthread self-reaps on
return, so kthread_stop()'s get_task_struct() could touch a freed
task_struct.
-
co_cb is embedded in the copy, but nfsd4_send_cb_offload() held a
reference only on the client, so a concurrent teardown could free
the copy while the CB_OFFLOAD callback was in flight.
Fix the teardown lifetime as a whole:
-
find_async_copy() unlinks the copy (clear cp_clp, list_del_init)
under async_lock; the cancel, shutdown, and sb-cancel paths drop the
list-membership reference via nfs4_put_copy() after nfsd4_stop_copy().
Drop the now-redundant list_del fixup from cleanup_async_copy().
-
Because unlinking hides the copy from the reaper, its
cleanup_async_copy() can no longer remove the copy's s2s_cp_stateids
entry; the cancel/shutdown/sb-cancel paths now call
nfs4_free_copy_state() themselves (while cp_clp is still valid) so
the entry does not dangle at freed memory for the laundromat and
manage_cpntf_state() to dereference.
-
Give the kthread its own reference, taken in nfsd4_copy() before
wake_up_process() and dropped at the end of nfsd4_do_async_copy();
call wake_up_process() before list_add().
-
Pin the task_struct with get_task_struct() in nfsd4_copy(), released
in nfs4_put_copy(), so kthread_stop() is safe whenever the kthread
exits. Set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED only in nfsd4_stop_copy(), which now
always kthread_stop()s before release_copy_files(); completion is
still reported via NFSD4_COPY_F_COMPLETED, so
nfsd4_has_active_async_copies() is unaffected. Each teardown caller
removes the copy from clp->async_copies first, so kthread_stop() runs
exactly once.
-
Take a copy reference in nfsd4_send_cb_offload(), dropped in
nfsd4_cb_offload_release(). The kthread still holds its own reference
there, so the refcount_inc() cannot race the final free.
-
Read cp_clp with smp_load_acquire() to pair with the unordered
set_bit()/clear_bit() writers (Documentation/atomic_bitops.rst).
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS Score: 9.8
AV:N - The flaw is in nfsd's NFSv4.2 OP_COPY and OP_OFFLOAD_CANCEL handlers (nfsd4_copy/nfsd4_offload_cancel in fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c), reached by sending COMPOUND RPCs over TCP port 2049 to the in-kernel NFS server; no local access to the host is required.
AC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race by starting an async COPY then issuing OFFLOAD_CANCEL or DESTROY_CLIENTID, and can stall CB_OFFLOAD replies so the embedded callback stays in flight on freed memory; the window is retryable and does not depend on uninfluenced victim state.
PR:N - Under AUTH_SYS, the default NFS configuration, the server verifies no secret; EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, and OPEN succeed for any host permitted by the export, so a remote NFSv4.2 client needs no kernel-verified credentials or local privileges on the server.
UI:N - The attacker's own NFS client issues COPY and OFFLOAD_CANCEL (or DESTROY_CLIENTID) against an already-running nfsd export; no administrator or other user action on the server is required.
S:U - Impact is kernel heap use-after-free and nfsd state corruption within the same host kernel security authority; it does not cross a VM, hypervisor, or IOMMU boundary.
C:H - Use-after-free of the nfsd4_copy object (including its embedded nfsd4_callback), nfsd_file src/dst objects, and the copy kthread task_struct allows slab reuse that can be leveraged for arbitrary kernel memory reads.
I:H - The same UAFs enable heap spraying and arbitrary writes; CB_OFFLOAD work and rpc_task callbacks invoke cb_ops function pointers that live inside the freed copy, supporting control-flow hijack.
A:H - Concurrent release_copy_files() double-puts nfsd_file, kthread_stop() can touch a self-reaped task_struct, and the copy kthread can NULL-dereference nf_dst after teardown, each of which oopses or panics the kernel.
| Attack Vector |
Network |
Scope |
Unchanged |
| Attack Complexity |
Low |
Confidentiality Impact |
High |
| Privileges Required |
None |
Integrity Impact |
High |
| User Interaction |
None |
Availability Impact |
High |
AV:N - The flaw is in nfsd's NFSv4.2 OP_COPY and OP_OFFLOAD_CANCEL handlers (nfsd4_copy/nfsd4_offload_cancel in fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c), reached by sending COMPOUND RPCs over TCP port 2049 to the in-kernel NFS server; no local access to the host is required.
AC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race by starting an async COPY then issuing OFFLOAD_CANCEL or DESTROY_CLIENTID, and can stall CB_OFFLOAD replies so the embedded callback stays in flight on freed memory; the window is retryable and does not depend on uninfluenced victim state.
PR:N - Under AUTH_SYS, the default NFS configuration, the server verifies no secret; EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, and OPEN succeed for any host permitted by the export, so a remote NFSv4.2 client needs no kernel-verified credentials or local privileges on the server.
UI:N - The attacker's own NFS client issues COPY and OFFLOAD_CANCEL (or DESTROY_CLIENTID) against an already-running nfsd export; no administrator or other user action on the server is required.
S:U - Impact is kernel heap use-after-free and nfsd state corruption within the same host kernel security authority; it does not cross a VM, hypervisor, or IOMMU boundary.
C:H - Use-after-free of the nfsd4_copy object (including its embedded nfsd4_callback), nfsd_file src/dst objects, and the copy kthread task_struct allows slab reuse that can be leveraged for arbitrary kernel memory reads.
I:H - The same UAFs enable heap spraying and arbitrary writes; CB_OFFLOAD work and rpc_task callbacks invoke cb_ops function pointers that live inside the freed copy, supporting control-flow hijack.
A:H - Concurrent release_copy_files() double-puts nfsd_file, kthread_stop() can touch a self-reaped task_struct, and the copy kthread can NULL-dereference nf_dst after teardown, each of which oopses or panics the kernel.
CVSS 3.1