In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: don't free session slots that are still in use
nfsd4_sequence() can free the very slot it is currently processing.
When the session shrinker has reduced se_target_maxslots below
se_fchannel.maxreqs, the shrink path checks three conditions before
calling free_session_slots():
- se_target_maxslots < maxreqs (shrink was advertised)
- slot->sl_generation == se_slot_gen (slot is up-to-date)
- seq->maxslots <= se_target_maxslots (client acknowledges)
However, seq->slotid is never checked against se_target_maxslots.
A client using a slot in the range [se_target_maxslots, maxreqs) can
satisfy all three conditions: its slot has the current generation
(set by a prior SEQUENCE), and it sends sa_highest_slotid <=
se_target_maxslots to acknowledge the reduction.
free_session_slots() then kfrees every slot at index >=
se_target_maxslots, including the caller's own slot. The function
continues to write sl_seqid, sl_flags, sl_generation, and stores the
dangling pointer in cstate->slot. Later, nfsd4_store_cache_entry()
copies up to maxresp_cached bytes of the compound reply into the freed
sl_data[] array, corrupting whatever slab object now occupies that
address.
Additionally, a concurrent thread processing SEQUENCE on a different
high-numbered slot can have its slot freed out from under it.
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE is set under nn->client_lock before the lock is
released, so any concurrent thread past SEQUENCE will have its slot
marked. However, free_session_slots() does not check NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE
before freeing.
Fix both problems by:
1. Checking that the current request's slotid is below the shrink
boundary.
2. Scanning slots in the to-be-freed range for NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE and
deferring the shrink if any are active.
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS Score: 9.8
AV:N - The bug is in nfsd4_sequence() in the in-kernel NFSv4.1 server (fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c). A remote client reaches it by sending COMPOUND RPCs with OP_SEQUENCE over TCP/2049 after EXCHANGE_ID/CREATE_SESSION; no local access to the NFS server is required.
AC:L - After CREATE_SESSION with multiple slots, the attacker can grow the slot table and consume DRC memory so the nfsd-DRC-slot shrinker lowers se_target_maxslots, which SEQUENCE replies report. A SEQUENCE on a high slotid with sa_highest_slotid acknowledging the shrink then kfree's that in-use slot. Slotid, maxslots, cachethis, and concurrent COMPOUNDs are attacker-controlled.
PR:N - Typical nfsd deployments accept AUTH_SYS/AUTH_NULL without cryptographic authentication. Any host allowed by the export ACL can EXCHANGE_ID/CREATE_SESSION and then SEQUENCE (ALLOWED_WITHOUT_FH, no filehandle or OPEN required); no local account or capability on the NFS server is needed.
UI:N - The attacking NFS client sends the EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, and crafted SEQUENCE compounds itself. No victim user or administrator action on the NFS server, such as mounting an export or opening a file, is required.
S:U - The use-after-free corrupts nfsd session-slot heap objects inside the NFS server host kernel. Impact stays in that kernel security authority and does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.
C:H - free_session_slots() kfree's the nfsd4_slot still referenced by cstate->slot. Later nfsd4_store_cache_entry() and SEQUENCE processing read the freed object, including sl_cred. Slab reuse of the DRC slot (up to 2048-byte sl_data) enables arbitrary kernel memory disclosure per UAF guidance.
I:H - After the kfree, nfsd4_sequence() writes sl_seqid, sl_flags, and sl_generation through the dangling pointer, and nfsd4_store_cache_entry() copies up to maxresp_cached bytes of the compound reply into freed sl_data[] and runs free_svc_cred() on reused memory, yielding a kernel heap write/arbitrary-free primitive.
A:H - Use-after-free of the in-use session slot oopses or panics nfsd when the dangling cstate->slot is dereferenced or when concurrent SEQUENCE threads hit a freed slot. The attacker can repeat the SEQUENCE compounds to deny NFS service and take down the host.
| Attack Vector |
Network |
Scope |
Unchanged |
| Attack Complexity |
Low |
Confidentiality Impact |
High |
| Privileges Required |
None |
Integrity Impact |
High |
| User Interaction |
None |
Availability Impact |
High |
AV:N - The bug is in nfsd4_sequence() in the in-kernel NFSv4.1 server (fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c). A remote client reaches it by sending COMPOUND RPCs with OP_SEQUENCE over TCP/2049 after EXCHANGE_ID/CREATE_SESSION; no local access to the NFS server is required.
AC:L - After CREATE_SESSION with multiple slots, the attacker can grow the slot table and consume DRC memory so the nfsd-DRC-slot shrinker lowers se_target_maxslots, which SEQUENCE replies report. A SEQUENCE on a high slotid with sa_highest_slotid acknowledging the shrink then kfree's that in-use slot. Slotid, maxslots, cachethis, and concurrent COMPOUNDs are attacker-controlled.
PR:N - Typical nfsd deployments accept AUTH_SYS/AUTH_NULL without cryptographic authentication. Any host allowed by the export ACL can EXCHANGE_ID/CREATE_SESSION and then SEQUENCE (ALLOWED_WITHOUT_FH, no filehandle or OPEN required); no local account or capability on the NFS server is needed.
UI:N - The attacking NFS client sends the EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, and crafted SEQUENCE compounds itself. No victim user or administrator action on the NFS server, such as mounting an export or opening a file, is required.
S:U - The use-after-free corrupts nfsd session-slot heap objects inside the NFS server host kernel. Impact stays in that kernel security authority and does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.
C:H - free_session_slots() kfree's the nfsd4_slot still referenced by cstate->slot. Later nfsd4_store_cache_entry() and SEQUENCE processing read the freed object, including sl_cred. Slab reuse of the DRC slot (up to 2048-byte sl_data) enables arbitrary kernel memory disclosure per UAF guidance.
I:H - After the kfree, nfsd4_sequence() writes sl_seqid, sl_flags, and sl_generation through the dangling pointer, and nfsd4_store_cache_entry() copies up to maxresp_cached bytes of the compound reply into freed sl_data[] and runs free_svc_cred() on reused memory, yielding a kernel heap write/arbitrary-free primitive.
A:H - Use-after-free of the in-use session slot oopses or panics nfsd when the dangling cstate->slot is dereferenced or when concurrent SEQUENCE threads hit a freed slot. The attacker can repeat the SEQUENCE compounds to deny NFS service and take down the host.
CVSS 3.1