In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: restart ssc_expire_umount walk after dropping nfsd_ssc_lock
nfsd4_ssc_expire_umount() walks nn->nfsd_ssc_mount_list with
list_for_each_entry_safe(ni, tmp, ...). For each expired entry it
sets nsui_busy = true, drops nfsd_ssc_lock to run mntput() on the
source vfsmount, then reacquires the lock to list_del + kfree the
entry and continue iterating via the macro's saved tmp pointer.
The nsui_busy flag protects the current ni from concurrent
nfsd4_ssc_setup_dul() finders during the lock-drop window, but it
does not pin tmp. Another nfsd RPC thread that fails its source-
server mount and reaches nfsd4_ssc_cancel_dul() will, during that
same window, take nfsd_ssc_lock, list_del + kfree its own ssc_umount
item, and release the lock. If that item is the saved tmp of the
expire walk, the next iteration dereferences a freed
nfsd4_ssc_umount_item.
Restart the walk from the head after the mntput() unlock window so
no saved next pointer survives the lock-drop. The list is bounded
by the number of active inter-server source mounts (typically small)
and the expire delayed-work runs periodically rather than per-IO,
so the restart is cheap.
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS Score: 9.8
AV:N - The UAF is between nfsd4_ssc_expire_umount() and nfsd4_ssc_cancel_dul(); cancel_dul runs from nfsd4_copy() on NFSv4.2 OP_COPY, reached by a COMPOUND over TCP/2049 to in-kernel nfsd. A remote client populates nfsd_ssc_mount_list and frees the saved iterator with no local access.
AC:L - The attacker drives both race sides with concurrent async inter-server COPY requests: completed copies leave expired nfsd4_ssc_umount_item entries for the laundromat, while a COPY to another source IP fails vfs_kern_mount() into cancel_dul() during mntput(). An attacker-controlled source NFS server can stall unmount, so the window is attacker-created and retryable.
PR:N - Under AUTH_SYS (default for typical NFS deployments) the server verifies no secret; EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, and OPEN succeed for any host allowed by the export, so no server-verified privileges are required to issue the COPY compounds that hit setup_dul/cancel_dul.
UI:N - The attacker’s own NFS client issues the COPY compounds and source-server traffic that create, expire, and cancel ssc_umount items; no administrator or other user action on the victim server is required.
S:U - The use-after-free is of a kmalloc’d nfsd4_ssc_umount_item in the nfsd host kernel; impact stays within the same kernel security authority and does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.
C:H - After cancel_dul() kfree()s the saved tmp, the expire walk continues from a freed nfsd4_ssc_umount_item whose vfsmount, list links, and metadata the attacker can replace via slab reuse, giving a UAF read primitive over kernel heap.
I:H - The expire path then writes nsui_busy, calls mntput() on attacker-controlled nsui_vfsmount, and runs list_del()/kfree() on poisoned pointers, yielding arbitrary-write and control-flow hijack primitives from the same UAF.
A:H - Dereferencing the freed list node in nfsd4_ssc_expire_umount() oopses or panics the laundromat worker even without a full exploit, taking down the in-kernel NFS server.
| Attack Vector |
Network |
Scope |
Unchanged |
| Attack Complexity |
Low |
Confidentiality Impact |
High |
| Privileges Required |
None |
Integrity Impact |
High |
| User Interaction |
None |
Availability Impact |
High |
AV:N - The UAF is between nfsd4_ssc_expire_umount() and nfsd4_ssc_cancel_dul(); cancel_dul runs from nfsd4_copy() on NFSv4.2 OP_COPY, reached by a COMPOUND over TCP/2049 to in-kernel nfsd. A remote client populates nfsd_ssc_mount_list and frees the saved iterator with no local access.
AC:L - The attacker drives both race sides with concurrent async inter-server COPY requests: completed copies leave expired nfsd4_ssc_umount_item entries for the laundromat, while a COPY to another source IP fails vfs_kern_mount() into cancel_dul() during mntput(). An attacker-controlled source NFS server can stall unmount, so the window is attacker-created and retryable.
PR:N - Under AUTH_SYS (default for typical NFS deployments) the server verifies no secret; EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, and OPEN succeed for any host allowed by the export, so no server-verified privileges are required to issue the COPY compounds that hit setup_dul/cancel_dul.
UI:N - The attacker’s own NFS client issues the COPY compounds and source-server traffic that create, expire, and cancel ssc_umount items; no administrator or other user action on the victim server is required.
S:U - The use-after-free is of a kmalloc’d nfsd4_ssc_umount_item in the nfsd host kernel; impact stays within the same kernel security authority and does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.
C:H - After cancel_dul() kfree()s the saved tmp, the expire walk continues from a freed nfsd4_ssc_umount_item whose vfsmount, list links, and metadata the attacker can replace via slab reuse, giving a UAF read primitive over kernel heap.
I:H - The expire path then writes nsui_busy, calls mntput() on attacker-controlled nsui_vfsmount, and runs list_del()/kfree() on poisoned pointers, yielding arbitrary-write and control-flow hijack primitives from the same UAF.
A:H - Dereferencing the freed list node in nfsd4_ssc_expire_umount() oopses or panics the laundromat worker even without a full exploit, taking down the in-kernel NFS server.
CVSS 3.1