In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Bound rsp_info_len to avoid OOB sense-data read
In qla2x00_status_entry(), the FWI2 status path advances sense_data and
shrinks par_sense_len by rsp_info_len:
<pre>
if (IS_FWI2_CAPABLE(ha)) {
sense_data += rsp_info_len;
par_sense_len -= rsp_info_len;
}
</pre>
rsp_info_len is a 32-bit value taken directly from the target's FCP
response (sf.rsp_data_len), while par_sense_len is the IOCB data area
size (28 bytes for 24xx, 60 bytes for 29xx). A hostile or buggy target
reporting an rsp_info_len larger than par_sense_len makes the unsigned
subtraction underflow to a huge value and advances sense_data out of
bounds.
The underflowed par_sense_len then defeats the cap in
qla2x00_handle_sense():
<pre>
if (sense_len > par_sense_len)
sense_len = par_sense_len;
memcpy(cp->sense_buffer, sense_data, sense_len);
</pre>
so the memcpy reads up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE bytes from the
out-of-bounds sense_data pointer, leaking adjacent response-ring/heap
memory into the command's sense buffer.
Clamp rsp_info_len to par_sense_len before the subtraction so
par_sense_len can never underflow and sense_data stays within the IOCB
data area. The fix sits before the comp_status switch, covering both
qla2x00_handle_sense() call sites.
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
CVSS Score: 9.1
AV:N - qla2xxx builds initiator status IOCBs from a remote Fibre Channel or FCoE target's FCP_RSP; QLogic CNAs speak FCoE and SAN fabrics are stretched across sites via FCIP/inter-fabric routing, so a malicious or compromised target delivers the crafted rsp_data_len over the storage network with no local access.
AC:L - A hostile target fully controls FCP_RSP (SS_RESPONSE_INFO_LEN_VALID, rsp_data_len, sense_len, CHECK CONDITION, rsp_info[3]==0) and can return them on ordinary initiator I/O such as INQUIRY during fabric scan; no race, rare config, or victim state beyond a FWI2-capable HBA is required.
PR:N - Completions are handled in the HBA interrupt/response-queue path (qla24xx_process_response_queue to qla2x00_status_entry) with no Linux credential or capability check; the attacker only needs to act as an FC/FCoE target on the fabric.
UI:N - Once the target is visible on the fabric, the SCSI midlayer automatically issues commands (scan, path checks, mounted-filesystem I/O) whose STATUS_TYPE completions take the vulnerable path; no user mount, open, or other interactive step is required at exploit time.
S:U - The out-of-bounds read and any resulting oops stay inside the host kernel that owns the qla2xxx driver and do not cross a VM, IOMMU, or other separate security authority.
C:H - Attacker-controlled 32-bit rsp_info_len advances sense_data out of the 28-byte IOCB data area and underflows par_sense_len so qla2x00_handle_sense() copies up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE (96) bytes of adjacent response-ring or kernel memory into the command sense buffer, which userspace can read via SCSI completion, SG_IO, and BSG.
I:N - The memcpy destination is the in-bounds SCSI sense buffer already capped at SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE; this is a source over-read only, with no out-of-bounds write, use-after-free, or control-flow hijack primitive.
A:H - Adding a 32-bit attacker-chosen rsp_info_len to sense_data yields a wild kernel pointer; memcpy from an unmapped address in the interrupt-context response-queue path oopses or panics the host, and the target can repeat this on every command.
| Attack Vector |
Network |
Scope |
Unchanged |
| Attack Complexity |
Low |
Confidentiality Impact |
High |
| Privileges Required |
None |
Integrity Impact |
None |
| User Interaction |
None |
Availability Impact |
High |
AV:N - qla2xxx builds initiator status IOCBs from a remote Fibre Channel or FCoE target's FCP_RSP; QLogic CNAs speak FCoE and SAN fabrics are stretched across sites via FCIP/inter-fabric routing, so a malicious or compromised target delivers the crafted rsp_data_len over the storage network with no local access.
AC:L - A hostile target fully controls FCP_RSP (SS_RESPONSE_INFO_LEN_VALID, rsp_data_len, sense_len, CHECK CONDITION, rsp_info[3]==0) and can return them on ordinary initiator I/O such as INQUIRY during fabric scan; no race, rare config, or victim state beyond a FWI2-capable HBA is required.
PR:N - Completions are handled in the HBA interrupt/response-queue path (qla24xx_process_response_queue to qla2x00_status_entry) with no Linux credential or capability check; the attacker only needs to act as an FC/FCoE target on the fabric.
UI:N - Once the target is visible on the fabric, the SCSI midlayer automatically issues commands (scan, path checks, mounted-filesystem I/O) whose STATUS_TYPE completions take the vulnerable path; no user mount, open, or other interactive step is required at exploit time.
S:U - The out-of-bounds read and any resulting oops stay inside the host kernel that owns the qla2xxx driver and do not cross a VM, IOMMU, or other separate security authority.
C:H - Attacker-controlled 32-bit rsp_info_len advances sense_data out of the 28-byte IOCB data area and underflows par_sense_len so qla2x00_handle_sense() copies up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE (96) bytes of adjacent response-ring or kernel memory into the command sense buffer, which userspace can read via SCSI completion, SG_IO, and BSG.
I:N - The memcpy destination is the in-bounds SCSI sense buffer already capped at SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE; this is a source over-read only, with no out-of-bounds write, use-after-free, or control-flow hijack primitive.
A:H - Adding a 32-bit attacker-chosen rsp_info_len to sense_data yields a wild kernel pointer; memcpy from an unmapped address in the interrupt-context response-queue path oopses or panics the host, and the target can repeat this on every command.
CVSS 3.1