MISP has a file-handling vulnerability that could let certain authenticated users make the server read files or access internal network services.
When importing an XML file, MISP did not properly verify that the uploaded content was actually XML. Because of this, a user with permission to modify data could upload a file containing a local file path or a web address instead.
If a local file path was supplied, MISP could read that file from the server. If a URL was supplied, MISP could make a request to that address, including systems that may only be reachable from inside the organization’s network.
The vulnerability could therefore expose sensitive local files and allow unauthorized requests to internal services.
Exploitation required a valid MISP account with modify permissions, but no additional user interaction was needed.
Version affected: <2.5.47
The fix introduces two defensive measures in addMISPExportFile(): (1) a pre-parse validation that rejects any uploaded content not containing an XML document marker (the '<' character), preventing path or URL strings from reaching the XML parser; and (2) an explicit readFile => false option passed to Xml::build(), which disables the library's ability to interpret the input as a file path or URL to be read or fetched. Together these changes ensure that only genuine XML document content is parsed and that no server-side file access or network request is triggered by user-supplied data.