In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: defer qdisc freeing after failed creation
An RTM_NEWQDISC request can make clsact bind a populated shared ingress
block during ->init(), publishing an embedded mini_Qdisc to lockless
readers. If the same request has an invalid TCA_RATE, estimator setup
fails after ->init(); the unwind removes the pointer but synchronously
frees its containing qdisc while tc_run() may still hold it.
Retire failed qdiscs through the same RCU helper as normal destruction.
Inline the synchronous free into the callback now that no direct callers
remain.
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS Score: 7.8
AV:L - The trigger is a local rtnetlink RTM_NEWQDISC message (tc_modify_qdisc -> qdisc_create) with a clsact kind, a shared TCA_INGRESS_BLOCK and an invalid TCA_RATE. Packets only drive the reader side (tc_run), and no remote peer supplies the input that causes the bug.
AC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race: they repeat the failing clsact create, which runs qdisc_free() with no grace period, while pushing traffic through their own veth/dummy device so that tc_run() dereferences the published miniq. No outside condition is needed.
PR:L - tc_modify_qdisc only needs CAP_NET_ADMIN in the netns that owns the device, which an unprivileged user gets through unshare -Urn plus a self-created veth/dummy interface. That makes it reachable as PR:L rather than requiring init-namespace root.
UI:N - The attacker performs every step themselves: creating the shared block and filter, sending the failing RTM_NEWQDISC, and generating traffic. No victim action is needed.
S:U - The use-after-free and any resulting privilege escalation stay inside the same kernel security authority. No hypervisor or IOMMU boundary is crossed.
C:H - The mini_Qdisc embedded in the freed qdisc (a kmalloc'd object, so its slot can be reclaimed) is read by tc_run: miniq->block and miniq->filter_list are passed to tcf_classify. With a sprayed replacement object, the attacker controls these pointers, which can be used to leak kernel memory.
I:H - tc_run calls mini_qdisc_bstats_cpu_update(), which writes through the cpu_bstats pointer taken from the freed object, and tcf_classify follows a filter_list the attacker can control. After reclaim, this gives a controlled write and a path to hijacking control flow.
A:H - Freeing the qdisc while RCU readers in tc_run still hold its embedded miniq leads to KASAN splats and oopses when the packet path touches the freed or reallocated memory. The result is a kernel crash.
| Attack Vector |
Local |
Scope |
Unchanged |
| Attack Complexity |
Low |
Confidentiality Impact |
High |
| Privileges Required |
Low |
Integrity Impact |
High |
| User Interaction |
None |
Availability Impact |
High |
AV:L - The trigger is a local rtnetlink RTM_NEWQDISC message (tc_modify_qdisc -> qdisc_create) with a clsact kind, a shared TCA_INGRESS_BLOCK and an invalid TCA_RATE. Packets only drive the reader side (tc_run), and no remote peer supplies the input that causes the bug.
AC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race: they repeat the failing clsact create, which runs qdisc_free() with no grace period, while pushing traffic through their own veth/dummy device so that tc_run() dereferences the published miniq. No outside condition is needed.
PR:L - tc_modify_qdisc only needs CAP_NET_ADMIN in the netns that owns the device, which an unprivileged user gets through unshare -Urn plus a self-created veth/dummy interface. That makes it reachable as PR:L rather than requiring init-namespace root.
UI:N - The attacker performs every step themselves: creating the shared block and filter, sending the failing RTM_NEWQDISC, and generating traffic. No victim action is needed.
S:U - The use-after-free and any resulting privilege escalation stay inside the same kernel security authority. No hypervisor or IOMMU boundary is crossed.
C:H - The mini_Qdisc embedded in the freed qdisc (a kmalloc'd object, so its slot can be reclaimed) is read by tc_run: miniq->block and miniq->filter_list are passed to tcf_classify. With a sprayed replacement object, the attacker controls these pointers, which can be used to leak kernel memory.
I:H - tc_run calls mini_qdisc_bstats_cpu_update(), which writes through the cpu_bstats pointer taken from the freed object, and tcf_classify follows a filter_list the attacker can control. After reclaim, this gives a controlled write and a path to hijacking control flow.
A:H - Freeing the qdisc while RCU readers in tc_run still hold its embedded miniq leads to KASAN splats and oopses when the packet path touches the freed or reallocated memory. The result is a kernel crash.
CVSS 3.1