In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot's "WARNING in do_new_mount" saga
ntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes
it with insert_inode_locked() and so it's marked as I_NEW until
unlock_new_inode().
ntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was
already hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it
without touching the parent's i_rwsem and so can lock the inode.
If the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the
i_mutex_dir_key class.
That resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already
hold by now...
syzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug
"WARNING in do_new_mount"
since 2023. I can't take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot's
executor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a
directory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir()
takes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently:
mkdir("./sys") mount(NULL, "./sys", "sysfs")
ntfs_create_inode()
d_instantiate()
user_path_at() finds the dentry
do_lock_mount()
inode_lock(inode)
namespace_lock()
unlock_new_inode()
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key()
init_rwsem(&inode->i_rwsem)
unlock_mount()
inode_unlock(inode)
The mount side then releases a lock that according to the rwsem nobody
holds:
DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && ...):
count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff888043a854e8, owner = 0x0,
curr 0xffff888000244880, list empty
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5346 at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1368 __up_write
Call Trace:
inode_unlock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline]
unlock_mount fs/namespace.c:2892 [inline]
do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3828 [inline]
do_new_mount+0x777/0xa40 fs/namespace.c:3887
On PREEMPT_RT the same thing shows up as
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(rt_mutex_owner(lock) != current)
WARNING: kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h:193 at rt_mutex_slowunlock
The up_write() underflows the reset count. A following inode_lock() on
that directory then never returns. A path walk into the new directory
racing with the mkdir() corrupts the lock the same way via
inode_lock_shared() in lookup_slow().
Switch to d_instantiate_new() and drop the trailing unlock_new_inode().
All error paths bail out before that point with I_NEW still set and
keep using discard_new_inode().
May we never see this fscking bug report again.