In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs
The skb_pointer_if_linear() function checks whether a
memory region of length len starting at offset off into
the skb is in the linear area, and returns a pointer to
the region if so. The check currently subtracts between
skb_headlen and offset of the check, and since skb_headlen
is unsigned the subtraction can underflow. This causes the
bounds check to spuriously pass and generate an arbitrary
pointer of the form *(skb->data + off).
The only user of this helper is currently skb-backed BPF
dynptr code. Returning the wrong pointer leads to the
dynptr erroneously being backed with invalid memory.
Ensure the subtraction cannot underflow, and fail the check if
it would. Use u64 arithmetic to also prevent overflow when
calculating (skb_headlen(skb) - off) since off is unsigned.