In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: don't modify a session slot when replaying its cached reply
nfsd4_sequence() claims a session slot by setting NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE
under nn->client_lock. A reply served from the slot's reply cache does
not claim it, and that distinction lived only in cstate->status, which
nfsd4_sequence() set to nfserr_replay_cache. Commit cc028a10a48c
("NFSD: Hoist status code encoding into XDR encoder functions") moved
nfsd4_proc_compound()'s cstate->status assignment below the out:
label, and the replay path's goto out was the one path that relied on
skipping it. The test in nfsd4_sequence_done() therefore no longer
identifies a replay, and every replay now stores its reply and clears
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE as though it owned the slot.
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE is the interlock: check_slot_seqid() rejects every
sequence id for a slot that is in use, before replay_matches_cache()
runs. A replay never sets it, so two replays can be in flight on the
same slot at once. One can read slot->sl_cred under nn->client_lock
while the other's completion frees and rebuilds it from the XDR
encoder without that lock. Two completions can also collide with each
other and release the same group_info twice. free_svc_cred() leaves
cr_uid, cr_gid and cr_flavor intact, so the reader passes every
earlier test in same_creds() and dereferences a NULL cr_group_info.
From a 6.12.91 production server:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004
CPU: 63 UID: 0 PID: 39015 Comm: nfsd
RIP: 0010:same_creds+0x38/0xa0 [nfsd]
RDX: 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
nfsd4_sequence+0x6a8/0x910 [nfsd]
nfsd4_proc_compound+0x345/0x670 [nfsd]
nfsd_dispatch+0x100/0x220 [nfsd]
svc_process_common+0x311/0x700 [sunrpc]
svc_process+0x131/0x1c0 [sunrpc]
svc_recv+0x7ef/0x9c0 [sunrpc]
nfsd+0xa3/0x100 [nfsd]
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Since v6.14 a live session's slot table can shrink, and the unowned
store becomes a use-after-free write. nfsd4_sequence() defers the
shrink while a slot is in use, but it tests NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE, which a
replay does not set, so free_session_slots() can kfree() the slot the
replay still holds in cstate->slot.
Record the claim in cstate->slot_owned when nfsd4_sequence() accepts a
request and test that in nfsd4_sequence_done(), so only the request
that claimed the slot updates its cached reply and clears
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE. svc_generic_init_request() zeroes the compound
response before each request, so the flag starts clear.
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS Score: 9.8
AV:N - The attacker sends an NFSv4.1 COMPOUND whose first operation is OP_SEQUENCE, carrying sessionid, slotid, and seqid, over TCP. nfsd_dispatch() calls nfsd4_proc_compound(), which calls nfsd4_sequence(); when seqid equals slot->sl_seqid the replay path runs, and nfs4svc_encode_compoundres() calls nfsd4_sequence_done() on that slot.
AC:L - The replay arm of nfsd4_sequence() never sets NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE, and check_slot_seqid() rejects another SEQUENCE for the slot only while that flag is set. The attacker sends two overlapping COMPOUND replays of one slot seqid, so both calls reach nfsd4_store_cache_entry() and free_svc_cred() on the same slot->sl_cred.
PR:N - svcauth_unix_accept() copies the RPC_AUTH_SYS uid, gid, and supplementary groups from the call and checks only an AUTH_NULL verifier. The attacker uses that asserted identity for EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, and the replayed OP_SEQUENCE; nfsd4_sequence() accepts it with no capability or GSS check.
UI:N - The attacker completes the attack by sending EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, and the overlapping SEQUENCE replays on its own connections.
S:U - Impact is confined to the kernel that handled the COMPOUND, the same security authority as the corrupted nfsd4_slot and its embedded svc_cred.
C:H - free_svc_cred() releases slot->sl_cred.cr_group_info without nn->client_lock while another replay, in replay_matches_cache(), calls same_creds() and groups_equal() on that pointer. groups_equal() reads ngroups and gid[] from a group_info that put_group_info() may already have passed to groups_free().
I:H - Both replay completions call free_svc_cred() on one slot->sl_cred, so both call put_group_info() on its cr_group_info; groups_free() kvfrees it while the other completion still uses it. A replay also leaves NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE unset, so after nfsd_slot_shrinker_scan() lowers se_target_maxslots, free_session_slots() can kfree the slot and nfsd4_store_cache_entry() writes sl_cred and sl_data through the dangling cstate->slot.
A:H - init_svc_cred() in free_svc_cred() clears cr_group_info but leaves cr_uid, cr_gid, and cr_flavor, so same_creds() passes those checks and groups_equal() dereferences NULL. That oops is the fatal nfsd exception reported from nfsd4_sequence().
| Attack Vector |
Network |
Scope |
Unchanged |
| Attack Complexity |
Low |
Confidentiality Impact |
High |
| Privileges Required |
None |
Integrity Impact |
High |
| User Interaction |
None |
Availability Impact |
High |
AV:N - The attacker sends an NFSv4.1 COMPOUND whose first operation is OP_SEQUENCE, carrying sessionid, slotid, and seqid, over TCP. nfsd_dispatch() calls nfsd4_proc_compound(), which calls nfsd4_sequence(); when seqid equals slot->sl_seqid the replay path runs, and nfs4svc_encode_compoundres() calls nfsd4_sequence_done() on that slot.
AC:L - The replay arm of nfsd4_sequence() never sets NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE, and check_slot_seqid() rejects another SEQUENCE for the slot only while that flag is set. The attacker sends two overlapping COMPOUND replays of one slot seqid, so both calls reach nfsd4_store_cache_entry() and free_svc_cred() on the same slot->sl_cred.
PR:N - svcauth_unix_accept() copies the RPC_AUTH_SYS uid, gid, and supplementary groups from the call and checks only an AUTH_NULL verifier. The attacker uses that asserted identity for EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, and the replayed OP_SEQUENCE; nfsd4_sequence() accepts it with no capability or GSS check.
UI:N - The attacker completes the attack by sending EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, and the overlapping SEQUENCE replays on its own connections.
S:U - Impact is confined to the kernel that handled the COMPOUND, the same security authority as the corrupted nfsd4_slot and its embedded svc_cred.
C:H - free_svc_cred() releases slot->sl_cred.cr_group_info without nn->client_lock while another replay, in replay_matches_cache(), calls same_creds() and groups_equal() on that pointer. groups_equal() reads ngroups and gid[] from a group_info that put_group_info() may already have passed to groups_free().
I:H - Both replay completions call free_svc_cred() on one slot->sl_cred, so both call put_group_info() on its cr_group_info; groups_free() kvfrees it while the other completion still uses it. A replay also leaves NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE unset, so after nfsd_slot_shrinker_scan() lowers se_target_maxslots, free_session_slots() can kfree the slot and nfsd4_store_cache_entry() writes sl_cred and sl_data through the dangling cstate->slot.
A:H - init_svc_cred() in free_svc_cred() clears cr_group_info but leaves cr_uid, cr_gid, and cr_flavor, so same_creds() passes those checks and groups_equal() dereferences NULL. That oops is the fatal nfsd exception reported from nfsd4_sequence().
CVSS 3.1