In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix buffer overflow in SMB2_tcon()
In SMB2_tcon(), unc_path is allocated with a fixed buffer size of
MAX_SHARENAME_LENGTH * 2 bytes (672 bytes). However, the user-controlled
UNC path (tree) length is passed to cifs_strtoUTF16(), which assumes the
destination buffer is large enough and writes strlen(tree) + 1 UTF-16 code
units.
Commit 62a1a439e0fd ("cifs: clean up handling of unc= option") removed the
length check on UNC mount options, allowing mount paths to exceed
MAX_SHARENAME_LENGTH while retaining the fixed-size buffer allocation in
SMB2_tcon(). Consequently, an oversized UNC string causes cifs_strtoUTF16()
to write past the end of the heap object, resulting in a slab-out-of-bounds
write. Furthermore, if a tree exceeds MAX_TREE_SIZE characters, strscpy()
truncates it in cifs_tcon::tree_name, causing subsequent reconnects or
failovers to fail.
Fix this by first verifying that the length of tree does not exceed
MAX_TREE_SIZE, returning -EINVAL if it does. Then, dynamically allocate
unc_path based on the length of tree so that it safely accommodates all
UTF-16 code units for paths within MAX_TREE_SIZE.
[pc: remove unused MAX_SHARENAME_LENGTH]
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS Score: 9.8
AV:N - The oversized tree string is the NetworkAddress of an SMB2 FSCTL_DFS_GET_REFERRALS reply. parse_dfs_referrals() copies it with cifs_strndup_from_utf16(), dfs_parse_target_referral() stores it via smb3_parse_devname() as ctx->UNC, and cifs_get_tcon() or tree_connect_dfs_target() passes it to SMB2_tcon(). SMB2/3 over TCP/445 is routable.
AC:L - The server sets the FSCTL_DFS_GET_REFERRALS NetworkAddress and can reset TCP. Signing stays off unless ctx->sign or CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN is set, so cifs_enable_signing() leaves the session unsigned. SMB2_tcon() then always passes strlen(tree) to cifs_strtoUTF16() on a 672-byte allocation.
PR:N - The attacker is the SMB server. With signing off, session setup completes on STATUS_SUCCESS without the server knowing the client's password, and the client then issues FSCTL_DFS_GET_REFERRALS on the IPC tcon. No client capability is checked on that receive path.
UI:N - On an existing DFS mount, dfs_cache_refresh() replaces the cached target when the TTL expires. The server then resets TCP; smb2_reconnect_server() calls smb2_reconnect(), which calls cifs_tree_connect() and tree_connect_dfs_target() into SMB2_tcon() with no user action.
S:U - The write lands in the host kernel heap inside SMB2_tcon(). That is the same security authority as the cifs client; it does not cross a guest-to-host or IOMMU boundary.
C:H - A share longer than 511 characters makes cifs_strtoUTF16() spill past the kmalloc-1k object that holds the 672-byte unc_path buffer. Corrupting an adjacent allocation's pointer or length yields an out-of-bounds read.
I:H - cifs_strtoUTF16() writes the server-chosen tree as UTF-16 past the 672-byte unc_path object into neighboring kmalloc-1k slots. That out-of-bounds write can corrupt heap metadata and hijack control flow.
A:H - The slab out-of-bounds write in SMB2_tcon() oopses the kernel when it hits an unmapped or poisoned object, and the server can force it again on every reconnect.
| Attack Vector |
Network |
Scope |
Unchanged |
| Attack Complexity |
Low |
Confidentiality Impact |
High |
| Privileges Required |
None |
Integrity Impact |
High |
| User Interaction |
None |
Availability Impact |
High |
AV:N - The oversized tree string is the NetworkAddress of an SMB2 FSCTL_DFS_GET_REFERRALS reply. parse_dfs_referrals() copies it with cifs_strndup_from_utf16(), dfs_parse_target_referral() stores it via smb3_parse_devname() as ctx->UNC, and cifs_get_tcon() or tree_connect_dfs_target() passes it to SMB2_tcon(). SMB2/3 over TCP/445 is routable.
AC:L - The server sets the FSCTL_DFS_GET_REFERRALS NetworkAddress and can reset TCP. Signing stays off unless ctx->sign or CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN is set, so cifs_enable_signing() leaves the session unsigned. SMB2_tcon() then always passes strlen(tree) to cifs_strtoUTF16() on a 672-byte allocation.
PR:N - The attacker is the SMB server. With signing off, session setup completes on STATUS_SUCCESS without the server knowing the client's password, and the client then issues FSCTL_DFS_GET_REFERRALS on the IPC tcon. No client capability is checked on that receive path.
UI:N - On an existing DFS mount, dfs_cache_refresh() replaces the cached target when the TTL expires. The server then resets TCP; smb2_reconnect_server() calls smb2_reconnect(), which calls cifs_tree_connect() and tree_connect_dfs_target() into SMB2_tcon() with no user action.
S:U - The write lands in the host kernel heap inside SMB2_tcon(). That is the same security authority as the cifs client; it does not cross a guest-to-host or IOMMU boundary.
C:H - A share longer than 511 characters makes cifs_strtoUTF16() spill past the kmalloc-1k object that holds the 672-byte unc_path buffer. Corrupting an adjacent allocation's pointer or length yields an out-of-bounds read.
I:H - cifs_strtoUTF16() writes the server-chosen tree as UTF-16 past the 672-byte unc_path object into neighboring kmalloc-1k slots. That out-of-bounds write can corrupt heap metadata and hijack control flow.
A:H - The slab out-of-bounds write in SMB2_tcon() oopses the kernel when it hits an unmapped or poisoned object, and the server can force it again on every reconnect.
CVSS 3.1