CVE-2026-99590 PUBLISHED

ceph: clamp the inline data length in ceph_fill_inline_data()

Assigner: Linux
Reserved: 25.09.2026 Published: 20.11.2026 Updated: 22.11.2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: clamp the inline data length in ceph_fill_inline_data()

The MDS decides how much inline data to attach to a reply, and the client parses inline_len without any upper bound: ceph_decode_need() only verifies that the message actually carries that many bytes. ceph_fill_inline_data() then copies the data into a single folio with no length check, so a malicious or buggy MDS returning more inline data than the folio can hold writes past its end.

Clamp the length to folio_size() so both callers, handle_cap_grant() and fill_inode(), are covered.

Metrics

CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS Score: 9.8

AV:N - The MDS supplies inline_len and the following payload in a CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REPLY, decoded by parse_reply_info_inline_data and passed through handle_reply and ceph_fill_inode, or in a v4+ CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS decoded by parse_inline_data and passed through ceph_handle_caps and handle_cap_grant; both copy it in ceph_fill_inline_data over the TCP messenger. AC:L - A new inode has i_inline_version 0 and i_truncate_seq 0. The MDS reply sets a non-directory mode, size > 0, inline_version greater than 1, and CEPH_CAP_FILE_CACHE, so ceph_fill_file_size stores a non-zero i_size and ceph_fill_inode copies into a freshly created, non-uptodate page 0. PR:N - handle_reply and ceph_handle_caps accept inline_len from the MDS peer on the session opened by ceph_real_mount. That peer is the remote cluster endpoint, and the copy runs with no local user credential consulted. UI:N - open_root_dentry issues CEPH_MDS_OP_GETATTR during ceph_real_mount, and that reply is what handle_reply feeds to ceph_fill_inode. The MDS delivers inline_len in its own response; no later user action is required. S:U - The memcpy corrupts memory of the kernel that mounted ceph, which is the same security authority as the filesystem client. C:H - ceph_fill_inline_data memcpy's MDS-chosen bytes from the message through kmap_atomic or memcpy_to_folio past the single page at index 0, so the write continues into the adjacent direct-map page and can corrupt neighboring kernel objects into a disclosure primitive. I:H - inline_len is the u32 from the MDS message, checked only by ceph_decode_need against the message end. The destination page is PAGE_SIZE, and the memcpy writes that full attacker-chosen length past the end of the page. A:H - The overrun past that page writes into adjacent kernel memory and oopses the client; inline_len can extend to the messenger front limit of 16MB.

Product Status

Vendor Linux
Product Linux
Versions Default: unaffected
  • affected from 31c542a199d79f0f402c2f3e04229464510d47ec to b325a1f0d441bb1925ef3c1e09d1db05ecfcc12c (excl.)
  • affected from 31c542a199d79f0f402c2f3e04229464510d47ec to f07b16256d7041c60dd2e205783d5d3a7934f884 (excl.)
  • affected from 31c542a199d79f0f402c2f3e04229464510d47ec to 9d06011f8c5b4c9989397a501483fec0f4a149cb (excl.)
  • affected from 31c542a199d79f0f402c2f3e04229464510d47ec to 9c1d14d3b66b3e1dd96ee664c0dd2548f2b77a52 (excl.)
Vendor Linux
Product Linux
Versions Default: affected
  • Version 3.19 is affected
  • unaffected from 0 to 3.19 (excl.)
  • unaffected from 6.12.118 to 6.12.* (incl.)
  • unaffected from 6.18.64 to 6.18.* (incl.)
  • unaffected from 7.3.5 to 7.3.* (incl.)
  • unaffected from 7.4-rc1 to * (incl.)

References